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INTRODUCTION 
Appellees respectfully submit this Petition for Rehearing 
pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
because Appellees believe that when this.Court filed its 
October 26, 1990 Opinion (hereafter -Opinion-) (attached hereto as 
Addendum "A") in this case, this Court either overlooked or 
misapprehended certain points of controlling case law and 
unequivocal expressions of legislative intent contained in recent 
statutory amendments. This Court should grant the Petition for 
Rehearing in this particular case because the Opinion is based 
exclusively upon this Court's recent decision of Projects 
Unlimited, Inc. v. Copper State Thrift & Loan Co., 142 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 7 (Utah 1990), which was filed on September 6, 1990, the same 
day this Court heard oral argument in this case. (Copy of 
Projects Unlimited attached hereto as Addendum -B H). Because this 
Court's Projects Unlimited decision did not exist until after the 
parties had already briefed and argued this matter, neither party 
had an opportunity to analyze and address the application of the 
Projects Unlimited rationale to this case. 
Appellees recognize that on October 17, 1990 this Court 
denied the September 20, 1990 Petition for Rehearing filed in the 
Projects Unlimited case. However, a review of that Petition 
reveals that no legal arguments were directed towards the merits 
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of the jurat issues raised therein, particularly the requirements 
of §46-1-1, £t seq. Utah Code Ann. and the applicability of the 
doctrine of substantial compliance. Appellees genuinely believe 
that the issues raised herein have not been fully considered by 
this Court in the Projects Unlimited case or in this case. For 
the reasons set forth below, this Court should afford Appellees an 
opportunity to argue the merits or lack of merits in applying the 
Projects Unlimited rationale here. 
SUMMARY QF ARfflJMgNT 
This Court should rehear argument in this case because 
this Court's exclusive reliance upon the Projects Unlimited 
decision effectively deprived Appellees of their opportunity to 
analyze the rationale of the Projects Unlimited decision to 
address that case in its briefs and argument. In addition, there 
are a number of legal and policy arguments not raised in the 
Projects Unlimited case which this Court should further consider 
before it determines to excuse some express statutory requirements 
while requiring strict compliance with others. The Projects 
Unlimited decision, and therefore the decision in this case, is 
flawed because statutory expressions of intent, through amendments 
to the Mechanics Lien Act and through the enactment of the 
Notaries Public Reform Act, make clear that lien notices must 
contain a jurat which completely conforms to the statutorily 
required elements. 
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Although this Court did not express any intent to do so 
in either this or in the Projects Unlimited case, the holding of 
these cases effectively overrules a line of important Utah 
decisions. The historical application of the doctrine of 
substantial compliance has been to cure an inadequate or 
incomplete attempt at meeting a statutory requirement. This 
Court's expansive application of the doctrine of substantial 
compliance in this case and in Projects Unlimited is a departure 
from this Court's historical practice, and now constitutes a rule 
of law permitting the complete absence of a required statutory 
element to be ignored. 
Appellees do not believe that this Court intended to 
overrule prior case law, ignore legislative intent, or create a 
new rule of law. This Court should grant this Petition for 
Rehearing to have the benefit of having these concerns addressed 
and to be fully advised of all ramifications of following and 
supporting the Projects Unlimited decision. 
APgUMENT 
I. THIS COURT'S COMPLETE RELIANCE ON THE PROJECTS UNLIMITED 
DECISION TO ANSWER THE QUESTION CERTIFIED BY THE U.S. DISTRICT 
COURT PREJUDICES APPELLEES AND FOLLOWS RATIONALE WHICH OUGHT 
TO BE RECONSIDERED. 
On September 6, 1990 this Court heard oral argument in 
this case on the question of whether, in 1984, the absence of the 
notary's place of residence from a jurat is fatal to the validity 
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of the mechanic's lien upon which the jurat appears. Unbeknownst 
to Appellees and on that same date, this Court handed down its 
decision in Projects Unlimited, which effectively answered the 
federal court's certified question. Not surprisingly, on 
October 26, 1990, this Court filed its decision in this case 
stating its ruling in three sentences that the Projects Unlimited 
decision was controlling. 
The unfortunate coincidence of the Projects Unlimited 
decision's being announced at the same time Appellees were 
presenting their oral argument to this Court has effectively 
deprived Appellees of their ability to brief and argue the 
controlling, precedential law to this Court. Upon a closer 
analysis of the Projects Unlimited decision and the underlying 
parties' briefs filed therein, Appellees believe that there are 
significant legal issues not raised in that case which should have 
been considered. Further, Appellees believe that there are 
practical consequences to this Court's decisions here and in 
Projects Unlimited which this Court did not address, nor intend. 
For the following reasons this Court should grant Appellee's 
petition for rehearing and allow Appellees an opportunity to 
highlight for this Court the difficulties of Projects Unlimited 
and its likely progeny. 
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II. THIS COURT OVERLOOKED OR MISAPPREHENDED IMPORTANT LEGISLATIVE 
AMENDMENTS WHICH AROSE AFTER BRIEFING IN PROJECTS UNLIMITED 
WAS COMPLETED. 
In Projects Unlimited, this Court recognized that 
mechanics liens are "purely statutory/ and lien claimants may only 
acquire a lien by complying with the statutory provisions 
authorizing them.- 142 Utah Adv. Rep. at 9 (citation omitted). 
Yet this Court ruled that the complete omission of the statutorily 
required element of the notary's place of residence will have no 
effect on the validity of the lien by operation of the doctrine of 
substantial compliance. This particular application of the 
doctrine of substantial compliance departs from established case 
law. 
A. The Utah Legislature's Intent In 1984 And Presently Is 
That Mechanics Liens Be Acknowledged In Accordance With 
Utah Code Ann. §46-1-1 fit seq. 
A recent amendment to the mechanics lien law makes clear 
that in 1984, the legislature desired all mechanic's liens to 
contain a jurat in conformance with §46-1-1, fit seq. The 
mechanics lien at issue here was recorded on June 4, 1984. The 
applicable mechanics lien statute at that time, Utah Code Ann. 
§38-1-7 (Supp. 1983), stated that every notice of lien "must be 
verified by the oath of [the lien claimant] or of some other 
person." This Court held last year that a valid verification 
requires, among other things, a "proper jurat." Mickelsen v. 
CraiQCo, Inc., 767 P.2d 561, 564 (Utah 1989). 
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As this Court noted in Projects Unlimited, 142 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 9 n.4, the Utah Legislature amended the mechanics lien 
statute in 1985 in an apparent attempt to simplify lien notices by 
removing the requirement of verification# and therefore of the 
jurat. However, the legislature apparently recognized the need 
for a proper jurat because, as this Court further noted in 
Projects Unlimited, the statute was amended again in 1989, 
reinstating the requirement that a notice of lien contain a jurat. 
In 1989, the legislature amended the mechanic's lien 
statute to specifically provide a particular jurat form. 
The current statute requires Man acknowledgment or 
certificate as required under Chapter 3, Title 57.M Utah 
Code Ann. §38-1-7(2)(e) (Supp. 1990). 
Id. at 9, n.8 (emphasis added). The "particular jurat formH 
referenced in §57-3-1 Utah Code Ann. (1989) is the form contained 
in §46-1-1, fit seq. Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1990). That statute has 
consistently required the notary to affix his residence or 
location with the jurat. 
1. The Projects Unlimited case did not take into 
account the legislature's expression that 
pre-April 29, 1985 liens contain a conforming jurat. 
This Court quoted at length from the new, amended section 
38-1-7(2) Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1990) in footnote 2 to the 
Projects Unlimited decision with one notable and critical 
exception — this Court made no mention of the fact that the 
legislature expressed its intent that all liens prior to April 29, 
1985 and after April 24, 1989 be acknowledged with the particular 
jurat form contained in §46-1-1, fit seq. Utah Code Ann. 
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The actual language appearing in the statute and 
apparently not considered by this Court is as follows: 
This notice shall contain a statement setting forth 
the following information: 
• • • 
(e) the signature of the lien claimant or his 
authorized agent and an acknowledgement or certificate as 
required under Chapter 3, Title 57. No acknowledgment or 
certificate is required for any notice filed after 
April 29, 1985, and before April 24, 1989. 
§38-1-7(2)(e) Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1990). The necessary 
implication of this subsection is that the legislature intended 
all liens recorded prior to the 1985 amendment to be acknowledged 
under §57-3-1 Utah Code Ann. (1990). That statute now reads, in 
(2) Notarial acts affecting real property in this 
state shall algp hs. performed in conformance with 
Chapter 1, Title 46. 
(Emphasis added.) The legislative intent of §57-3-1 is clear. To 
be recorded, a document must be acknowledged, and any notarial act 
must be in conformance with the Notary Public Act, which expressly 
required, at least in 1984, the "place of residence" of the notary. 
B. The Legislature's Recent Enactment of the Notaries Public 
Reform Act Did Not Relax The "Place Of Residence" 
Requirement, But Rather Magnified The Requirement By 
Compelling More Specificity. 
The 1988 enactment of the Notaries Public Reform Act 
heightened the place of residence requirements for jurats. In 
1984, §46-1-8 Utah Code Ann. (1953) stated as follows: 
To all acknowledgments, oaths, affirmations and 
instruments of every kind taken and certified by a notary 
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public he shall affix to his signature his official title 
and his place of residence and the date on which his 
commission expires. 
In 1988, the Utah legislature repealed former §46-1-1 to 46-1-10 
Utah Code Ann. (1953), and enacted the Notaries Public Reform Act, 
codified as §46-1-1 to §46-1-17 Utah Code Ann. (1988). This 
repeal and amendment gave the legislature an opportunity to 
reconsider the technical requirements of jurats and relax those 
requirements if it desired to do so. However, rather than relax 
the requirements of a jurat the legislature chose to require more 
specificity. Section 46-1-13 Utah Code Ann. now requires all 
notaries to obtain a notarial seal which "shall" include "the 
address of the notary's business or residence." 
§46-1-13(3)(a)(iii) Utah Code Ann. (1988). Further amendments 
were made to the Notaries Public Reform Act effective July 1, 
1990, which amendments perpetuated the "address" requirements of 
§46-1-13(3)(a)(iii) Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1990) and added more 
requirements for the notarial seal. £££# e.g. §46-1-13(3)(a)(iv) 
Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1990). 
Changing the notary statutes to require the notary's 
"address" necessarily implies two important concepts. First, the 
legislature looked at and considered the address requirements of 
the previous statutes and determined to retain that requirement. 
Second, and equally important, the legislature chose not to 
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perpetuate the general "place of residence" requirement and 
elected to enhance the requirement by calling for the more 
specific "address" of the notary. 
C. The 1989 Amendment To The Mechanics Lien Statute And The 
1988 Enactment Of The Notaries Public Reform Act Make 
Clear The Legislature's Intent Regarding Jurats And What 
Must Be Contained In Them. 
This Court's decision in Projects Unlimited overlooked or 
misapprehended the expressions of legislative intent described 
above. These significant changes were not and could not be called 
to this Court's attention by the parties in the Projects Unlimited 
case. And because this Court felt itself bound by Projects 
Unlimited, Appellees suggest that the Court overlooked or 
misapprehended important arguments in favor of requiring 
compliance with the jurat requirements. 
In Projects Unlimited, this Court cited to a 1975 Oregon 
Supreme Court decision for the proposition that the modern trend 
is to "dispense with arbitrary rules which have no demonstrable 
value in a particular fact situation." 142 Utah Adv. Rep. at 9 
(quoting Consolidated Elec. Distribs.. Inc. v. Jepson Elec. 
Contracting, Inc., 537 P.2d 80, 83 (Or. 1975)). This Court then 
went on to state that Utah has "followed this trend both in the 
legislature and in the courts", pointing to the 1985 amendment to 
the mechanics lien law which removed the verification 
requirement. Id. 
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The difficulty with the above proposition that the 
legislature is relaxing lien content requirements is that it 
ignores the more recent expressions of the legislature reinstating 
the jurat requirements for liens and mandating more specificity 
for jurat content. The recent amendments identified above 
expressly rebut the proposition implied in Projects Unlimited that 
a lien's jurat is a "cumbersome" requirement needing only 
substantial compliance. While lien "content" requirements may be 
undergoing a gradual legislative simplification process, the jurat 
requirements for mechanic's liens have become more/ not less 
exacting in recent years. 
III. THIS COURT'S EXPANSIVE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF 
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE IN THIS CASE AND IN PROJECTS UNLIMITED 
CREATES INCONSISTENCIES WITH PRIOR DECISIONS. 
This Court's application of the doctrine of substantial 
compliance expands upon and effectively unsettles the rules 
applicable to mechanic's liens. 
A. PrpjectS Unlimited Renders MicKelsen And Baker 
Meaningless. 
This Court recently settled the question of what 
constitutes a valid verification in Mickelsen v. Craiaco. Inc.. 
767 P.2d 561 (Utah 1989). 
We adopt as our rule that for a valid verification/ 
(1) there must be a correct written oath or 
affirmation, and (2) it must be signed by the 
affiant in the presence of a notary or other person 
authorized to take oaths, and (3) the latter must 
affix a proper jurat. 
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Id. at 564 (emphasis added). In an earlier decision, expressly 
reaffirmed by the Mickelsen court, this Court stated that "A 
notary public who signs a jurat must comply with All fif the 
requirements &f U.C.A., 1953, §46-1-1, fit £fig." PaKer v, 
Schwendiman, 714 P.2d 675, 677 (Utah 1986) (emphasis added). 
This Court has consistently held that what constitutes a 
••proper jurat" is a statutory matter, and Utah statutory law in 
effect at the time of the notice of lien in the instant case 
provided that a notary must affix "his place of residence" to all 
instruments certified. Yet this Court departed from its well 
settled policy and stated in Projects Unlimited that "substantial 
compliance would certainly be sufficient to satisfy [the jurat] 
requirement." 142 Utah Adv. Rep. at 10. 
The rules of law expressed in Mickelsen and Baker are 
irreconcilable with the result in Projects Unlimited. In Projects 
Unlimited, the jurat contained only two of the four requirements 
in effect then. Only the signature and official title appeared, 
while the place of residence and date of commission expiration 
were absent. Projects Unlimited's application of the doctrine of 
substantial compliance to excuse the complete absence of 50% of 
the statutorily required elements of a jurat renders the proper 
jurat requirements of Mickelsen and Baker meaningless. It also 
renders meaningless the express statutory imperative regarding the 
contents of jurats. To reaffirm Projects Unlimited by following 
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it in this case calls into question the validity of Mickelsen and 
certainly overrules the expression of law in Baker, This cannot 
have been the intent of this Court. 
B. The Doctrine Of Substantial Compliance Should Not Be Used 
To Excuse The Complete Absence Of A Statutorily Required 
Element. 
Other applications of the doctrine of substantial 
compliance by this Court demonstrate that while substantial 
compliance may be applied to cure an attempt at meeting a 
statutory requirement, the doctrine cannot be used to fill a 
void. Before considering prior applications, this Court should 
have in mind that the Mickelsen decision expressly reaffirmed the 
holdings of First Security Mortgage Co. v. Hansen, 631 P.2d 919 
(Utah 1981), Graff v. Boise Cascade Corp.. 660 P.2d 721 (Utah 
1983) and Baker v. Schwendiman. 714 P.2d 675 (Utah 1986). 767 
P.2d at 564. 
In the First Security case, the lien holder made the 
claim that the corporate acknowledgement contained in the lien 
substantially complied with the verification requirements. The 
lienholder also claimed that to invalidate the lien on the basis 
of an incorrect verification would be a "mere hypertechnicality.H 
631 P.2d at 921. Responding to this claim, this Court held: 
Our statute leaves no room for doubt as to the 
requirement of a verified notice of claim, and this Court 
in Eccles Lumber Co. v. Martin, 31 Utah 241, 87 P. 713 
(1906), stated that since a mechanic's lien is statutory 
and not contractual, a lien cannot be acquired unless the 
claimant complies with the statutory provisions. 
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• • • • 
In view of this holding, defendant's argument that 
it was nevertheless in substantial compliance with the 
lien statute is unavailing. 
Id. at 922. Under First Security, the complete failure to comply 
with statutory provisions prevents the creation of a lien, and 
this complete absence of a verification cannot be cured by 
application of the doctrine of substantial compliance. 
Perhaps the case most on point is Graff v. Boise Cascade 
Corp., 660 P.2d 721 (Utah 1983). In that case, the verification 
form was present, and only one of its elements was absent. 
Specifically, Mthe verification was complete except for the fact 
that the lien claimant's signature appear[ed] on the wrong line." 
660 P.2d at 722. This Court rejected the application of the 
doctrine of substantial compliance in the absence of an essential 
element to the verification. Ifl. at 723. In Graff, the absence 
of one statutory element was fatal to the lien. This contrasts to 
the Projects Unlimited holding that the absence of two statutorily 
required elements was not fatal to the lien. 
The Projects Unlimited decision calls into question the 
continuing validity and applicability of Mickelsen. Baker. First 
Security and Graff. Appellees respectfully submit that this Court 
has misapprehended the substantial compliance doctrine in Projects 
Unlimited and in this case. In both cases there was na 
compliance—substantial or otherwise—with the requirement that 
the notary provide Hhis place of residence." 
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Appellees respectfully submit that before overruling or 
seriously undermining this important line of Utah Supreme Court 
cases, the Court should grant the Petition for Rehearing, so that 
the soundness of the Projects Unlimited decision and its 
application in the present instance may be more thoroughly 
examined and tested. 
IV. DOCTRINES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION FAVOR REHEARING. 
In a recent decision, this Court set forth the rule of 
law regarding unambiguous expressions of legislative intent. 
When the language of a particular provision of a 
statute is ambiguous, the Court may attempt, following 
principles of statutory construction, to ascertain the 
intention of the Legislature; but where there is no 
ambiguity the plain language of the statute must be taken 
as the. expression of the legislature's intent * 
P.I.E. Employees Federal Credit Union v. Bass, 759 P.2d 1144, 1151 
(Utah 1988). There is nothing ambiguous about the legislature's 
desire that liens contain jurats, and that the jurats contain some 
description of the notary's address. Regardless of this Court's 
or anyone else's questions regarding the wisdom or policy reasons 
for such requirements, this Court has consistently honored 
legislative intent by recognizing that the cure for any harshness 
resulting from, or antiquity inherent in such requirements is a 
matter for the legislature. 
[W]e cannot eliminate those antiquated and apparently 
unnecessary statutory formalities and bring consistency 
and clarity to this area by judicial fiat. 
. . . . 
-14-
[A] complete remedy for the problems created by these 
statutes would be the legislature's enactment of a law 
repealing technical swearing requirements in all statutes 
and substituting the simple requirement that the 
documents or statements in question by signed or made 
under penalty of perjury. 
• • • • 
It would be most unfortunate if our action today served 
only to postpone a truly effective and thoroughgoing 
legislative remedy. 
Mickelsen, 767 P.2d at 565-6 (Zimmerman, J. concurring). Contrary 
to this Court's historical reticence to amend law by jurdicial 
fiat, this Court's decision in Projects Unlimited and consequently 
in this case overlooked and/or misapprehended the clear 
expressions of legislative intent in recent amendments, and 
implicitly overruled the clear, unambiguous rulings in other jurat 
and mecanic's lien cases 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellee respectfully requests 
that this Court grant their Petition for Rehearing. 
DATED this tf* ' day of November, 1990. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
Mark 0. M6rr 
Brent D. Wride 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellees 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
ooOoo-
John Garrett, dba Garrett 
Drywall, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Kenneth Rushton, Trustee, 
First American Savings Bank, 
F.S.B., North Carolina, FSLIC as 
receiver, American Federal Savings 
and Loan Association, Anderson, 
Indiana, Trustee, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Attorneys: J- Keith Henderson, Salt Lake City, for Garrett 
Mark 0. Morris, Brent D. Wride, Salt Lake City, 
for First American & FSLIC, 
Kenneth A. Rushton, Salt Lake City, for himself 
On Certification from the United States District Court 
for the District of Utah, The Honorable Bruce S. Jenkins 
STEWART. Justice: 
This case is here on a question of law certified by 
the United States District Court for the District of Utah. The 
question certified is: "[I]is a notice of lien placed of 
record lacking the place of residence of a notary, but 
otherwise complete . . . , void under Utah law?" 
John Garrett, dba Garrett Drywall, filed a notice of 
lien to secure payment of money due for drywall work performed 
during the construction of the Brianhead Hotel in Brianhead, 
Iron County, Utah, The entities that constructed the Brianhead 
Hotel and the Brianhead Hotel Corporation filed bankruptcy 
petitions in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the 
District of Utah, Central Division. Pursuant to bankruptcy 
court approval, the Brianhead Hotel was sold subject to liens 
against the property on the date of sale. The appellees, the 
beneficial interest holders of a trust deed secured by the 
revision before r\.-, .. 
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Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
proceeds of the sale, challenged the validity of Garrett's lien 
on the ground that the notary failed to include his place of 
residence under his name on the jurat, as required by Utah Code 
Ann. § 46-1-8 (1981) (currently § 46-1-13 (Supp. 1990)). 
All other statutory requirements for a valid jurat were met. 
The bankruptcy court held that a proper jurat must 
show "the county of residence of the notary public" and that 
the absence of that "essential element of a . . . jurat is not 
substantial compliance" under Utah law. On that basis, the 
bankruptcy court held that Garrett did not have a valid lien. 
That ruling was appealed to the United States District Court, 
and Chief Judge Jenkins certified the issue of the correctness 
of that ruling to this Court for resolution. 
The precise question posed by the district court was 
recently addressed in Projects Unlimited, Inc, v> Copper State 
Thrift & Loan Co., 142 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (Utah 1990). This 
Court held that the failure of a notary to affix the notary's 
place of residence to the jurat did not invalidate a mechanic's 
lien under either the mechanic's lien statute or the notary 
public statute. Accordingly, we hold that there was 
substantial compliance with Utah Code Ann. § 46-1-8 (1981) and 
that Garrett's lien is not invalid because of the absence of 
the notary's place of residence from the jurat. 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, 
Richard C. Howe, 
Chief Justice 
Christine 
Chie f Justice 
r Associate 
M. Durham, Justice 
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice 
No. 890494 2 
ADDENDUM B 
C O D E • CO 
Erovo, Utah 
Projects Unlimited v. Copper State Thrift 
IKUiah Ariv trp 7 
Cite ts 
142 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PROJECTS UNLIMITED, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
COPPER STATE THRIFT & LOAN CO., 
Valley Bank 
£ Trust Co., Cottonwood Thrift £ Loan Co., 
Western Savings & Loan Co., Bradshaw 
Development Co., et al., 
Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 160340 
FILED: September 6, 1990 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Judith M. Billings 
ATTORNEYS: 
Ellen Maycock, Robert F. Babcock, Darrel J. 
Bostwick, Salt Lake City, for appellant 
Jon C. Heaton, James Boevers, Salt Lake 
City, for Copper State Thrift & Loan Co., 
Valley Bank & Trust Co., Cottonwood 
Thrift & Loan Co., and Western Savings & 
Loan Co. 
Jeffrey M. Jones, Salt Lake City, for Copper 
State 
Dennis V. Haslam, Kathy A. F. Davis, 
Salt Lake City, for Cottonwood Thrift 
Steven D. Crawley, Salt Lake City, for 
Bradshaw Development Co. 
Richard K. Nebeker, Salt Lake City, for 
Metier 
Matthew F. Hilton, Draper, for 
Stringfellow and Highland Orchards 
Allen Sims, Gary E. Doctorman, Salt Lake 
City, for Hugo F. Diederick 
Richard A. Rappapon, Salt Lake City, for 
Carolyn L. Nielsen 
Julian D. Jensen, Salt Lake City, for Brent 
Ivie Electric, Inc. 
Bruce A. Maak, Salt Lake City, for Deseret 
Pacific Mortgage and Scott A. Kafesjian 
This opinion b subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
ORME, Coort of Appeals Jadge: 
Projects Unlimited, Inc., appeals from a 
summary judgment invalidating its mechanic's 
lien against the interests of Copper State 
Thrift & Loan Company, Valley Bank & Trust 
Company, and Cottonwood Thrift ft Loan 
Company, Inc. We affirm the summary jud-
gment as to Cottonwood Thrift, but reverse as 
to Copper State and Valley Bank. 
1. FACTS 
Bradshaw Development Company, Inc. 
("Bradshaw"), owned a parcel of land, the 
Highland Orchards property, which it planned 
to develop into the Highland Orchards Con-
dominium project. The pioperty was divided 
into two parcels with the objective of constr-
ucting condominiums in two phases-phase 
I and phase II. Phase I, when completed, 
would consist of eighteen condominium units. 
Bradshaw engaged Projects Unlimited, Inc. 
("Projects"), to construct some of the phase I 
units. In September 1982, Bradshaw and 
Projects entered into a contract for the cons-
truction of two units-FF-6-Al and FF-
6-B1, hereinafter referred to as units 1 and 2. 
Those parties entered into a second contract in 
April 1983 concerning the contraction of six 
addi t ional u n i t s - F F - 5 - A l , FF-5-B1 , 
FF-11-A1, FF-11-A2, F F - l l - B l , and 
FF-11-B2, hereinafter referred to as units 3 
through 8, respectively. The contracts alloc-
ated prices on a per-unit basis. 
Copper State Thrift & Loan Company fin-
anced construction of the eight units. The 
Copper State loan to Bradshaw was secured by 
two trust deeds. The first deed was recorded in 
December 1982 and covered units 1 and 2. The 
second deed was recorded in June 1983 and 
covered units 3 through 8. 
Relying on the terms of its loan agreement 
with Bradshaw, Copper State refused to 
advance additional funds to Bradshaw in June 
1983. Sometime thereafter, Bradshaw stopped 
making payments to Projects. On October 7, 
1983, Projects ceased construction with a 
substantial balance still owing to Projects. 
Bradshaw did not record its condominium 
declaration until August 1983. 
During construction, units 1, 2, and 3 were 
sold. The sales of units 1 and 2 were financed 
by Valley Bank & Trust Company, which 
recorded trust deeds on those units in May 
1983. Copper State subordinated its December 
1982 trust deed to the May 1983 trust deeds of 
Valley Bank. The sale of unit 3 was financed 
by Western Savings £ Loan Company, which 
is not a party to this appeal. After construc-
tion was halted, units 4 and 5 were sold. The 
sales of these units were financed by Cotton-
wood Thrift £ Loan Company and secured by 
trust deeds recorded in December 1983. 
In November 1983, Projects recorded a 
notice of mechanic's lien against the Highland 
Orchards property. The notice described Bra-
dshaw as the owner of the subject property. 
The lien notice described the property by a 
metes and bounds description including all of 
the phase 1 and phase II property.1 The notice 
did not describe the eight constructed units, by 
employing tbeir descriptions as used in the 
condominium declaration or otherwise, nor 
did it allocate unpaid amounts attributable to 
each unit. The notice did not distinguish 
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between work performed under the September 
1982 and April 1983 contracts. The notice of 
lien cited the construction starting date as 
October 10, 1982, and the ending date as 
October 7, 1983. Although the notice of lien 
contained the signature and seal of a notary 
and the date of notarization, it did not give 
the notary's address or commission expiration 
date. 
Bradshaw and Projects negotiated to release 
from the lien units 4 and 5, financed by Cot-
tonwood Thrift. The lien release specifically 
stated that units 4 and 5 were released from 
the scope of the lien in exchange for the 
payment of $90,000. Thereafter, Projects filed 
an amended notice of lien. The amended 
notice was essentially identical to the initial 
notice except that $85,000 was added to the 
'credits and offsets" figure and subtracted 
from the 'balance owing" figure. The same 
metes and bounds description was used to 
describe the property. The amended notice did 
not exempt units 4 and 5 from the property 
description, but attached to it were a map of 
the entire condominium project and a copy of 
the partial release. 
Projects commenced an action to foreclose 
the lien and recorded a lis pendens in March 
1984. The complaint alleged that Bradshaw 
had breached its contracts with Projects. The 
complaint also called for a determination of 
priorities among the various claimants. Valley 
Bank was not named as a defendant in the 
complaint but had actual knowledge of the 
action at least by August 1984, when it revi-
ewed a title report showing Projects' lis 
pendens and initiated relevant correspondence 
with Projects. On May 24, 1985, almost 
twenty months after it ceased construction, 
Projects filed an amended complaint which 
joined Valley Bank and others as defendants. 
Bradshaw failed to answer either complaint, 
and a default judgment was entered against it 
in December 1985. 
Copper State, Cottonwood Thrift, Valley 
Bank, and Western Savings ('the Banks") 
moved for summary judgment on the remai-
ning claims. They collectively argued that 
Projects* lien was invalid under the mech-
anic's Hen statute and under the Condomi-
nium Ownership Act. Essentially, their argu-
ments under the mechanic's lien statute were 
that (1) the jurat lacked the notary's address 
and the date her commission expired, (2) the 
notice describes more property than was act-
ually subject to the hen, (3) the notice descr-
ibes property which Bradshaw initially did not 
own, and (4) the lien did not distinguish 
between work performed under the September 
1982 and April 1983 contracts. The Banks also 
argued that the Condominium Ownership Act 
required Projects to file a separate lien on 
each condominium unit as described in the 
condominium declaration. 
Valley Bank also argued that Projects had 
failed to join it as a defendant within the 
statutorily prescribed time and was therefore 
barred from later amending its complaint to 
add that bank as a defendant. Moreover, 
Cottonwood Thrift argued that it was not a 
proper party to the suit because Projects had 
released the units it financed from the scope 
of the lien. Projects filed a cross-motion for 
partial summary judgment on its claim against 
Copper State, its construction lender. 
The trial court granted the Banks' summary 
judgment motions and denied Projects* 
motion. The court concluded that (1) Projects 
had unequivocally released from the lien's 
coverage the units financed by Cottonwood 
Thrift, (2) Projects failed to join Valley Bank 
as a party within the required time, and (3) the 
lien was invalid due to improper notarization 
•and on grounds otherwise set forth in the 
moving defendants' memoranda on file/ 
On appeal, Projects challenges each of the 
trial court's conclusions. Primarily, it argues 
that Utah does not require a lien notarization 
to contain the notary's address and/or 
commission expiration date. 
The Banks assert the same arguments on 
appeal that they asserted in the trial court. In 
particular, they argue that we should affirm 
the trial court's decision on the notarization 
issue. Moreover, the Banks assert that, even 
assuming we were to agree with Projects on 
the notarization issue, we can and should 
affirm the summary judgment due to other 
failures in the lien notice. And indeed, "we 
may affirm trial court decisions on any proper 
ground(s), despite the trial court's having 
assigned another reason for its ruling." Buehner 
Block Co. v. UWC Assocs.. 752 P.2d 
892, 895 (Utah 1988); see a/so Stare v. One 
1979 Pontile Trans Am, 771 P.2d 682, 684 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). The Banks also cross-
appeal, seeking an award of attorney fees in 
the district court and on appeal. 
D. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
'Summary judgment is proper only when no 
genuine issue of material fact exists and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law." TnmsMmaic* Cash Reserve, 
Inc. v. Dixie Power St Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 
24, 25 (Utah 1990); me Utah R. Gv. P. 56(c). 
In our determination of whether the trial court 
properly granted summary judgment, we must 
review the facts in the light most favorable to 
the losing party. E.g.% Ron Case Roofing St 
Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 
1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). Moreover, we review 
the trial court's legal conclusions for correct-
ness and give no particular deference to that 
court's view of the law. Id. 
HI. MECHANIC'S LIENS GENERALLY 
We begin our analysis by recognizing that 
"|t)he purpose of the mechanic's ben act is 
remedial in nature and seeks to provide prot-
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eaion to laborers and materialmen who have 
added directiy to the value of the propeny of 
another by their materials or labor/ Calder 
Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922, 924 
(Utah 1982). On the other hand, we recognize 
that liens create "an encumbrance on propeny 
that deprives the owner of his ability to 
convey clear title and impairs his credit/ First 
Sec. Mtg. Co. v. Hansen, 631 P.2d 919, 922 
(Utah 1981), a fact the imponance of which is 
magnified by the pre-recordation priority 
accorded a valid mechanic's hen. See Utah 
Code Ann. §38-1-5 (1988). Sute legislat-
ures and courts attempt to balance these 
competing interests through their mechanic's 
lien statutes and judicial interpretations 
thereof. 
Mechanic's liens are purely statutory, and 
lien claimants may only acquire a lien by 
complying with the statutory provisions aut-
horizing them. Utah Sav. & Loan Assoc, v. 
Mecham, 12 Utah 2d 335, 338, 366 P.2d 598, 
600 (1961). However, Utah courts have reco-
gnized that substantial compliance with these 
provisions is all that is required.2 Chase v. 
Dawson, 117 Utah 295, 296, 215 P.2d 390, 
390 (1950); see also Graff v. Boise Cascade 
Corp., 660 P.2d 721, 722 (Utah 1983). More-
over, we have stated that "[a] lien once acqu-
ired by labor performed on a building with the 
consent of the owner should not ... be defe-
ated by technicalities, when no rights of others 
are infringed, and no express command of the 
statute is disregarded/ Eccies Lumber Co. v. 
Martin, 31 Utah 241, 249, 87 P. 713, 716 
(1906) (quoting 20 Am. & Eng. Encyclopedia 
of Law 276); see also Mickclscn v. Craig co, 
Inc., 767 P.2d 561, 563 (Utah 1989). Courts 
from other states also subscribe to this view. 
See, e.g., H.A.M.S. Co. v. Electrical Contr-
actors of Alaska, Inc., 563 P.2d 258, 263 
(Alaska 1977); Horseshoe Estates v. 2M Co., 
713 P.2d 776,781 (Wyo. 1986). 
Although courts have differing opinions 
about how liberally to construe provisions 
within their mechanic's lien statutes, 'the 
modem trend is to dispense with arbitrary 
rules which have no demonstrable value in a 
particular fact situation/3 Consolidated Elec. 
Distribs., Inc. v. Jepson Elec. Contracting, 
Inc., 272 Or. 376, 380, 537 P.2d 80, 83 (1975). 
Utah has followed this trend both in the legi-
slature and in the courts. A legislative example 
of this trend is the 1985 amendment to section 
38-1-7 of the mechanic's lien statute. The 
1985 amendment greatly simplified the mech-
anic's lien notice, dispensing with several of 
the more cumbersome lien notice requirem-
ents.4 One judicial example of this trend is 
Mickdsen, in which this court clarified the lien 
verification process and dispensed with the 
notion that the claimant's verification requ-
ired any formal ritual. 767 P.2d at 563. 
With these general principles in mind, we 
turn to the particular arguments in this case. 
Copper Sute Thrift
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We must determine whether the rigorous int-
erpretations urged by the Banks are necessary 
to protect the interests of the parties in the 
instant situation. Unless we find that Projects' 
alleged failures have compromised a purpose 
of the mechanic's lien statute, those failures 
will be viewed as technical, and in the absence 
of any prejudice, we will uphold the lien.5 
IV. INVALIDITY OF THE LIEN UNDER 
SECTIONS 3S-I-7 AND -S 
Sections 38-1-7 and 38-1-8 of Utah's 
mechanic's lien statute identify the statutory 
elements of a lien notice. At the time the 
dispute arose, section 38-1-7 provided that 
every notice of lien recorded with the county 
recorder must contain 
a notice of intention to hold and 
claim a lien, and a statement of his 
demand after deducting all just 
credits and offsets, with the name 
of the reputed owner if known or if 
not known, the name of the record 
owner, and also the name of the 
person by whom he was employed 
or to whom he furnished the mat-
erial, with a statement of the terms, 
time given and conditions of his 
contract, specifying the time when 
the first and last labor was perfo-
rmed, or the first and last material 
was furnished, and also a descrip-
tion of the property to be charged 
with the lien, sufficient for identif-
ication, which claim must be veri-
fied by the oath of himself or of 
some other person. 
Utah Code Ann. §38-1-7 (Supp. 1983).* 
Section 38-1-8 provided: 
Liens against two or more buildings 
or other improvements owned by 
the same person may be included in 
one claim; but in such case the 
person filing the claim must desig-
nate the amount claimed to be due 
to him on each of such buildings or 
other improvements. 
Utah Code Ann. §38-1-8 (1988). 
A. Failare of Ike Jnrat 
At the time the dispute arose, Utah Code 
Ann. §38-1-7 (Supp. 1983) provided that 
every notice of lien 'must be verified by the 
oath of (the lien claimant] or of some other 
person/ The district court found that a 
proper verification under section 38-1-7 
required compliance with Utah Code Ann. 
§46-1-8 (19S3), which provided: *To all 
acknowledgments, oaths, affirmations and 
instruments of every kind taken and certified 
by a notary public be shall affix to his signa-
ture his official title and his place of residence 
and the date on which his commission 
expires.9 The court then concluded that the 
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notary's failure to include her address and 
commission expiration date in the jurat inva-
lidated the verification, which made the lien 
void. We disagree. 
Initially, we note that verification is an 
essentia] part of a lien notice and 'not a 
hypertechnicality that we can discount.* First 
Sec. Mtg. Co. v. Hansen, 631 P.2d 919. 922 
(Utah 1981).7 Verification by the lien claimant 
was thought necessary so that "Iflrivolous, 
unfounded, and inflated claims can thereby be 
minimized, and the prejudgment property 
rights of the [property owners] receive their 
due protection." Id. Verification accomplishes 
this purpose by creating "the possibility of 
perjury prosecution for verifying a false lien 
claim." H.A.M.S. Co. v. Electrical Contrac-
tors of Alaska, Inc., 563 P.2d 258, 264 
(Alaska 1977) (lien must be signed by clai-
mant; corporate acknowledgment insufficient). 
Although the 1983 mechanic's lien statute 
requires verification, Utah Code Ann. §38-1-
7 (Supp. 1983), it does not state any particular 
procedure for verification. Those procedures 
have developed judicially in cases like First 
Security Mortgage. One of the most recent 
and instructive cases defining these procedures 
is Mickelsen v. Craigco, Inc., 767 P.2d 561 
(Utah 1989), decided after the trial court made 
its ruling in this case. In Mickelsen, we listed 
the essentia] elements for a proper verification: 
"(1) [TJhere must be a correct written oath or 
affirmation, and (2) it must be signed by the 
affiant in the presence of a notary or other 
person authorized to take oaths, and (3) the 
latter must affix a proper jurat." Id. at 564. 
The Banks do not contest that an oath was 
made or that it was signed before a notary. 
They simply argue that the notary failed to 
affix a "proper jurat" because she omitted her 
address and the expiration date of her com-
mission. 
The Banks would have us adopt a position 
requiring strict compliance with the notary 
public statute in order to satisfy the verifica-
tion requirement of the mechanic's lien statute 
as expounded in Mickelsen. We decline to 
adopt this position. A jurat is 'merely evid-
ence of the fact that the oath was properly 
taken before the duly authorized officer." 50 
C.J.S. Jurat 705 (1947); aee also Stem v. 
Board of Elections, 14 Ohio St. 2d 175, 181, 
237 N.E.2d 313, 317 (1968); Craig v. State, 
232 Ind. 293, 295, 112 N.EJd 296, 297 (1953) 
(purpose is to evidence that oath was made 
before authorized officer). In view of this 
principle, because the jurat in this case dearly 
evidenced that the joath was given before a 
aotary, it should be considered adequate. And 
even assuming that the legislature intended the 
inclusion of a jurat which conformed with the 
aotary statute,1 substantia] compliance would 
certainly be sufficient to satisfy that require-
ment. E.g., Chase v. Dawson, 117 Utah 295, 
296,215 P.2d 390,390 (1950). 
In this case, the jurat contained the notary's 
signature, the date, and her official seal. These 
items were sufficient to evidence the fact that 
the document had been verified. Moreover, 
anyone who questioned the validity of the 
notarization could certainly confirm its auth-
enticity with the simplest inquiry. Thus, we 
find that the lien's notarization substantially 
complied with the mechanic's lien and notary 
statutes. See, e.g., Georgia Lumber Co. v. Har-
rison Constr. Co., 103 W. Va. 1, 5, 136 
S.E. 399, 401 (1927) (notice sufficient though 
notary failed to affix official seal in contrav-
ention of statute); Stern, 237 N.E.2d at 317-
19 (failure of notary to affix signature to jurat 
did not invalidate affidavit). 
The purpose of the verification requirement 
is to assure that lien claimants file legitimate 
claims. First Sec. Mtg., 631 IP.2d at 922; see 
also H.A.M.S., 563 P.2d at 264. In First 
Security Mortgage and H.A.M.S., liens were 
held invalid because the lien notices did not 
contain the signature of the claimants but 
simply the signature of a notary attesting to 
the oath of the claimants. Unlike those cases, 
the president of Projects signed an oath that 
the contents of the hen notice were true and 
the notary attested to this fact. We see no 
policy reason why the notary's technical 
failure to include her address and commission 
expiration date increased, in any way, the 
likelihood that Projects would file a frivolous 
claim, especially since her failure presumably 
occurred after the verification was signed by 
the president. 
For the above reasons, we find that the lien 
notice substantially complied with the "proper 
jurat" requirement established in Mickelsen.9 
B. Other Grouds 
Though we disagree with the trial court's 
legal conclusion on the notarization issue, we 
may still affirm the summary judgment based 
upon one of the other failures in the lien 
notice. The Banks argue that the lien notice is 
invalid because the metes and bounds descri-
ption in the notice (1) covers more than one 
condominium unit without specifically refer-
encing each, (2) describes more property than 
is actually subject to the lien, and (3) describes 
property which was not initially owned by 
Bradshaw and because the notice fails to dis-
tinguish between work completed under the 
two separate contracts. 
These other grounds essentially challenge the 
descriptive contents of the hen notice. The 
purpose for descriptive terms in a lien notice is 
to adequately inform interested parties of the 
existence and scope of the lien. See Park Gty 
Meat Co. r. Coamock Silver Mining Co., 36 
Utah 145, 155, 103 P. 254, 260 (1906); Ecdes 
Lumber Co. v. Martin, 31 Utah 241, 249, 87 
P. 713, 717 (1906); see also Parsons v. Keeney, 
98 Conn. 745,749,120 A. 505, 507 (1923); Beall 
Pipe A Tank Corp. v. Tumac Intenno-
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untain, Inc., 108 Idaho 487, 490, 700 P.2d 
109, 112 (Ct. App. 1985); Consolidated EJec. 
Distribs., Inc. v. Jepson Elec. Contracting, 
inc., 272 Or. 376, 382, 537 P.2d 80, 82 (1975). 
Thus, courts look to see whether interested 
parties have been informed of the existence of 
the lien and whether the lien has misled or 
prejudiced those parties. See Eccles, 87 P. at 
717; see also Ball, 700 P.2d at 112; Horse-
shoe Estates v. 2M Co., 713 P.2d 776, 781 
(Wyo. 1986). When lien notices have suffici-
ently informed interested persons that a lien 
exists on identifiable property and the comp-
laining party has not been misled by the 
notice, the purpose of the provisions has not 
been thwarted and courts are inclined to find 
substantia] compliance. See, e.g., Horseshoe, 
713P.2dat781. 
As we analyze each of the Banks* challenges 
to the lien description, our main purpose is to 
determine whether the notice adequately inf-
ormed the Banks of the existence of the lien 
and whether the Banks were prejudiced, as a 
matter of law, by the descriptive terms. 
'Absent any such claim of prejudice or being 
misled in any manner by the description[s] 
which [appear] in the lien statement, we [will] 
hold that it was sufficient. * id." 
1. Inclusion Of More Than One Unit Without 
Designating Each 
Section 38-1-7 provides, with our emph-
asis, that every notice of lien must contain "a 
description of the property to be charged with 
the lien, sufficient for identification." Utah 
Code Ann. §38-1-7 (Supp. 1983). Section 
38-1-8 provides in pertinent part: "Liens 
against two or more buildings... owned by the 
same person or persons may be included in 
one claim; but in such case the person filing 
the claim must designate therein the amount 
claimed to be due to him on each of such 
buildings." Utah Code Ann. §38-1-8 
(1988). The Banks argue that these two sect-
ions require Projects to allocate its contract 
claims among all the relevant condominium 
units. 
We begin our analysis with the first of three 
cases dealing with section 38-1-8 and its 
predecessor. In Eccles Lumber Co. v. Martin, 
31 Utah 241, 87 P. 713 (1906), the owner of 
property on which a mechanic's lien had been 
filed argued that a lien notice was invalid 
because it failed to separately sute amounts 
due on different structures. This court const-
rued the predecessor statute to section 38-1-1 
8, which contains language identical to that in 
section 38-1-8, and definitively stated that a 
blanket lien was not invalid for failing to all-
ocate the amounts due. Eccles, 87 P. at 717. 
The hen claimant's failure did 'not affect nor 
concern the owner of the property/ Id. He 
was 'fairly informed of the amount claimed 
against his property.9 Id. Rather, allocation 
was necessary 'to protect the interests of the 
Copper Sute Tbrift „ 
lien claimants between and among themse-
lves/ id. 
The next case in which we discussed the 
issue was United States Building & Loan 
Association v. Midvale Home Finance Corp., 
86 Utah 506, 44 P.2d 1090 (1935). In Midvale 
Home, a corporation promoted the construc-
tion and sale of homes in a subdivision. When 
the corporation defaulted on its construction 
loan, the loan company brought suit to fore-
close its mortgage on the subdivision property. 
We were called upon to determine the priori-
ties among the mortgage, several mechanic's 
liens, and the interests of the individual home 
purchasers. The home purchasers argued that 
they had priority over the lien claimants 
because the lien claimants did not allocate 
amounts due on the various houses constru-
cted in the subdivision. The purchasers atte-
mpted to distinguish Eccles on the basis that Ec-
cles involved only the original owner. We 
rejected this argument, concluding that the 
mechanic's liens 'attached before any of the 
claims of the unit holders/ id. at 519, 44 
P.2datl096. 
The final case in which we dealt with this 
subject was Utah Savings & Loan Association 
v. Mecham, 12 Utah 2d 335, 366 P.2d 598 
(1961). In Mecham, a claimant filed a hen 
covering numerous subdivision lots. Some of 
the lots were owned by the Mechams, and 
some, by another individual. The hen failed to 
allocate the amounts due on each lot. Mecham 
argued that the hen was invalid. We affirmed 
the genera] rules in Eccles and Midvale Home 
but concluded that the hen claimant could 
only aggregate claims if the various lots and 
structures described in the hen were owned by 
the same person. 
As in Midvale Home, the Banks in this case 
acquired their interests in the property subse-
quent to the time the mechanic's hen atta-
ched. Unlike the situation in the Mecham case, 
Bradshaw was apparently the only owner of 
the affected property when the hen attached, 
i.e., when construction started. Finally, the 
Banks do not argue that the hen misled them 
as to the claimed hen, nor have they demon-
strated any prejudice from the aggregation of 
the claims in this case. Thus, we hold that the 
lien notice was not invalid, at least as against 
the Banks, simply because Projects failed to 
segregate the contract amounts attributable to 
individual condominium units. 
2. Describing More Property Than Was 
Subject To Uen 
The Banks argue that even if Projects was 
not required to segregate the claims attribut-
able to each condominium unit, the lien was 
invalid for describing more property than was 
properly subject to the lien. However, the 
general rule is that the inclusion of 
more land than that to which the 
lien may properly attach does not 
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vitiate the ben upon so much of the 
land as is encompassed within the 
description and to which a lien may 
properly attach, at least if the des-
cription is not fraudulent or grossly 
misleading and innocent third 
parties are not affected. 
Annotation, Sufficiency of notice, churn, or 
statement of Mechanic's lien with respect to 
description or location of real property, 52 
A.L.R.2d 12, 83 (1957); see also Adams Tree 
Serv., Inc. v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 20 
Ariz. App. 214, 511 P.2d 658, 663 (1973) 
(valid portion of hen can be severed from 
invalid portion); Bcall Pipe £ Tank Corp. v. 
Tumac Intermountain, Inc., 108 Idaho 487, 
700 P.2d 109, 112 (Ct. App. 1985) ("the land 
properly subject to the hen is for the court to 
determine"); Park City Meat Co. v. Comstock 
Silver Mining Co., 36 Utah 145, 103 P. 254, 
259 (1909) ("court may limit the amount [of 
land] to what may be necessary"); Horseshoe 
Estates v. 2M Co., 713 P.2d at 781 (ben which 
contained "no adequate description of the 
property" upheld where no claim of prejudice 
or being misled); Engle v. First Nat'l Bank, 
590 P.2d 826, 832 (Wyo. 1979) (vabdating ben 
which described entire ranch rather than small 
parcel upon which house was constructed since 
no showing of prejudice by bank). 
We are persuaded that no purpose of the 
mechanic's ben statute would be served by 
totally invalidating a ben which overdescribes 
the property upon which the ben can properly 
attach. There is no evidence in the record to 
suggest that the description was fraudulent. 
Moreover, the Banks do not argue that they 
were misled or prejudiced by tne description. 
Therefore, we cannot say, ns a matter of law, 
that the overly broad description results in the 
ben's invalidity as to the Banks.11 
3. Describing Property Not Initially Owmed By 
Bradshaw 
The Banks argue that the description may 
have included property not even owned by 
Bradshaw at the time the work was comme-
nced on the project. They argue, citing 
Mecham, that this fact alone invabdates the 
ben. We do not think Mecham stands for this 
proposition. In Mecham, we invalidated the 
Hen because 'the materials, for which daim 
was made, were not furnished upon buildings 
owned by the same person or persons.9 12 
Utah 2d at 339, 366 P.2d at 601 (emphasis 
added). Here, the Banks do not argue that any 
of the materials or labor went into the const-
ruction of buildings not initially owned by 
Bradshaw but simply that tome of the land 
included in the notice was not owned by Bra-
dshaw at the outset of construction. 
We fail to see much of a distinction for this 
case between a ben which includes too much 
property owned by the same owner and too 
much property part of which is owned by 
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another person. In either event, the court can 
determine what part of the property is actually 
subject to the ben. Bcall Pipe A Tank Corp. v. 
Tumac Intermountain, Inc., 108 Idaho at 498, 
700 P.2d at 112. Whether the other person 
would have an action for slander of title is a 
separate matter. See supra note 11. Again, the 
Banks do not complain that they were actually 
misled or prejudiced by the notice. Thus, 
under these facts, the overly expansive prop-
erty description did not compromise any 
purpose of the statute and does not invalidate 
the ben as to the Banks. 
4. Inclusion Of Separate Contracts la One 
Lien 
The Banks also argue that the ben must fail 
because the construction work on the propeny 
was performed under two separate contracts. 
Although the Banks advance this argument, 
they fail to cite much authority to support 
their position or to give any pobcy reasons for 
adopting such a rule. Utah courts have not 
addressed this question before, and there is a 
split of authority among other jurisdictions 
which have considered it. 
Some courts have held that when work is 
performed under separate contracts, the work 
may not be aggregated into a single ben claim. 
Rather, a separate notice must be recorded for 
each contract. See, e.g., F.A. Drew Glass Co. v. 
Eagle MiU, 1 Kan. App. 614, 42 P. 387, 390 
(1895); Schively v. RadeU, 227 Pa. 434, 441, 
76 A. 209, 211 (1910). Other jurisdictions, 
however, have allowed ben claimants to file a 
single notice even though the work was perf-
ormed under more than one contract. See, e.g., 
Fixture * Plumbing Co., 1311 Ala. 256, 31 
So. 26, 28 (1901); Alabama State Fair £ 
Agricultural Assfn v. Alabama Oas Booth v. 
Pendola, 88 Cal. 36, 25 P. 1101, 1101 (1891); 
Parsons v. Keeney, 98 Conn. 745, 749, 120 A. 
505, 507 (1923); Saint Joseph's College v. Mor-
rison, Inc., 158 Ind. App. 272, 302 
N.E.2d 865, «74-76 (1973); Consolidated 
Elec. Distrib., Inc. v. Jemon Bee. Contrac-
ting, Inc., 272 Or. 376, 537 P.2d 80 (1975); 
Fischer v. Meiroff, 192 Wis. 482, 494, 213 
N.W. 283,285 (1927). 
After reviewing the various cases, we find 
more persuasive the cases which have allowed 
the aggregation of claims arising under more 
than one contract. In Consolidated Electric, 
one of the comparatively more recent cases, 
the Oregon Supreme Court allowed a lien 
claimant to file a single lien notice covering 
two contracts with separate owners. Although 
the court stated that it did not favor the pra-
ctice, it noted that each owner was sufficiently 
notified of the ben against its property and no 
I 'prejudice (had] been suffered by the defen-
dants in any material respect." 272 Or. at 383, 
537 P.2d at 83. The holding of Consolidated 
Electric significantly departed from earlier 
Oregon case law. See, e.g., Dimitre Elec. Co. 
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v. Paget, 175 Or. 72, 151 P.2d 630 (1*44). In 
changing its position, the Oregon court reco-
gnized that "the modem trend [in mechanic's 
hen law] is to dispense with arbitrary rules 
which have no demonstrable value in a parti-
cular fact situation." Consolidated Elec. Dist.t 
Inc., 272 Or. at 380, 537 P.2d at 82. 
The reasoning in Consolidated Electric 
makes sense, and we adopt that position in 
this case. Again, the Banks do not argue that 
the notice failed to adequately notify them of 
the existence of the hen or in any way preju-
diced them. Thus, we hold that the inclusion 
of claims arising under two separate contracts 
in a single hen notice did not invalidate Proj-
ects'ben. 
5. Summary 
The Banks do not seriously claim that any 
of the alleged description failures misled or 
prejudiced them. The lien notices, while not a 
model of clarity and precision, appear to have 
adequately accomplished the purposes of the 
statute as concerns the Banks. Thus, we hold 
that Projects' lien notice substantially comp-
lied with sections 38-1-7 and 38-1-8 of 
the mechanic's lien statute. Accordingly, the 
lien is valid, at least as between the parties to 
this appeal. 
V. INVALIDITY OF THE LIEN UNDER 
SECTION 574-19 
The Banks also argue that the lien notice 
was invalid under the Condominium Owner-
ship Act, which provides in pertinent part, 
with our emphasis: 
Subsequent to recording the decla-
ration as provided in this act, and 
while the property remains subject 
to this act, DO lien shall thereafter 
arise or be effective against the 
property. .During such period hens 
or encumbrances shall arise or be 
created only against each unit.... 
Utah Code Ann. §57-8-19 (1953). The 
Banks argue that Projects* hen arose and was 
effective only after recordation of the condo-
minium declaration. Thus, they argue, Proj-
ects was required to file a notice of hen for 
each specific condominium unit. 
Utah appellate courts have not had an 
opportunity to interpret section 57-8-19 in 
this context. However, both the Montana and 
Wisconsin Supreme Courts have interpreted 
statutes nearly identical to Utah's in contexts 
similar to this case. See Hostetter v. Inland 
Dev. Corp., 172 Mont. 167, 561 P.2d 1323 
(1977); Stevens Const!. Corp. v. Draper Hall, 
Inc., 73 Wis. 2d 104,242 N.W.2d 893 (1976). 
The facts in Hostetter, Stevens, and the 
instant case are essentially the same. In each 
case, the developer contracted for the constr-
uction of condominium units and construction 
work began. Thereafter, the developers filed 
condominium declarations. Some time later. 
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VI. VALLEY BANK DISMISSAL 
The trial court granted summary judgment 
to Valley Bank on the basis of Utah Code 
Aim. f38-1-11 (1988). That starute prov-
the contractors filed mechanic's hens which 
described the entire property on which the 
condominium complex was constructed and 
failed to allocate separate amounts to the 
different units. In each case, the defendants 
argued that a blanket lien over the entire 
project was inappropriate once the condomi-
nium declaration had been filed. 
The courts in both Hostetter and Stevens 
held that the blanket hen was sufficient. Hostet-
ter, 172 Mont, at 173, 561 P.2d at 1326-
27; Stevens, 73 Wis. 2d at 114, 242 N.W.2d at 
898. Both courts noted that the key factor was 
the point when the hens arose and became 
effective against the property; both courts held 
that this occurred at the commencement of 
construction. Hostetter, 172 Mont, at 172-73, 
561 P.2d at 1326; Stevens, 73 Wis. 2d at 114, 
242 N.W.2d at 898. The filing of the hen 
notice merely preserved and perfected the lien. 
Srevens, 73 Wis. 2d at 114, 242 N.W.2d at 
898. The only effect that the condominium 
declaration had was to make the blanket lien 
proportionately effective against each unit 
constructed under the subject contract along 
with its corresponding undivided interest in the 
common area. Hostetter, 172 Mont, at 174, 
561 P.2d at 1327; Srevens, 73 Wis. 2d at 114, 
242N.W.2dat898. 
The Banks attempt to distinguish Hostetter 
and Stevens. They note that, unlike this case, 
the work in those cases was done under a 
single contract. They argue that this fact alone 
should produce a different result, but they do 
not state the reasons for their conclusion. We 
have concluded that a hen notice may include 
work performed under separate contracts and 
fail to see why the result should be different 
when the work is performed on a condomi-
nium project.12 
We find the reasoning in Hostetter and 
Stevens sound and adopt their rationale. 
Section 57-6-19 does not affect the validity 
of the hen in this case. The hen arose and 
became effective when Projects commenced 
work on the project. As previously noted, the 
hen notice was sufficient to perfect that hen, 
making the hen valid at least as to the units 
properly subject to the hen and as between the 
parties to this appeal. The only effect of 
section 57-8-19 and the intermediate filing 
of the declaration was to make the hen prop-
ortionately effective against each unit constr-
ucted under the subject contracts and each 
such unit's corresponding undivided interest in 
the common area. Having concluded that the 
hen notice is not facially invalid as to the 
Banks, we turn now to the separate arguments 
presented by Valley Bank and Cottonwood 
Thrift. 
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ides in pertinent part: 
Actions to enforce (mechanic's] I 
liens must be begun within twelve 
months after the completion of the 
original contract, or the suspension 
of work thereunder for a period of 
thirty days. Within the twelve 
months herein mentioned the lien 
claimant shall file for record with 
the county recorder of each county 
in which the lien is recorded a 
notice of the pendency of the 
action, in the manner provided in 
actions affecting the title or right to 
possession of real property, or the 
hen shall be void, except as to 
persons who have been made parties 
to the action and persons having 
actual knowledge of the commenc-
ement of the action.... 
Id. 
Projects commenced this action and reco-
rded its lis pendens five months after it ceased 
construction, well within the statutory twelve-
month period. It did not, however, add Valley 
Bank as a defendant until it filed its amended 
complaint, nearly twenty months after const-
ruction ceased. Valley Bank argued, and the 
trial court agreed, that section 38-1-11 is a 
statute of limitation13 which required Projects 
to name Valley Bank as a defendant within the 
twelve-month period, on pain of its action 
against Valley Bank being forever barred. We 
read section 38-1-11 differently. 
Section 38-1-11 has two requirements 
which serve two different purposes. First, the 
statute requires the lien claimant to commence 
his action within twelve months of the comp-
letion of the project or suspension of work. See 
supra note 13. Valley Bank argues that the 
lien claimant is also required by this provision 
to join all persons having an interest in the 
property within the twelve-month period. 
However, the statute does sot expressly 
require the hen claimant to do so and, on the 
contrary as hereafter explained, obviously 
contemplates the joinder of defendants not 
initially named after the expiration of the 
twelve-month period. 
The second 'requirement* of section 38-1-
11 is that the lien claimant file a lis pendens 
within the twelve-month period. However, 
the limited effect of a failure to comply with 
this requirement is expressly set forth in the 
statute. When a claimant fails to file the lis 
pendens within the twelve-month period, the 
lien itself is not invalidated, but rather it is 
rendered void as to everyone except those 
named in the action and those with actual 
knowledge of the action. By contrast, it 
follows logically, timely recordation of the lis 
pendens imparts constructive notice to all 
persons concerned with the property of the 
action to enforce the lien, see Utah Code Ann. 
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§78-40-2(1989), regardless of whether they 
were named as parties or had actual knowl-
edge of the action. 
Valley Bank's contrary interpretation would 
render portions of the statute meaningless or 
nonsensical. See Milieu v. Cltrk Clinic Corp., 
609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980) ('[SJututory 
enactments are to be so construed as to render 
all parts thereof relevant and meaningful, and 
that interpretations are to be avoided which 
render some pan of a provision nonsensical or 
absurd.9). For one thing, it would be pointless 
to provide that a lien would be valid as against 
persons with actual knowledge of the action to 
enforce the lien who had not been named as 
parties in the action as filed within the twelve-
month period unless it were fully anticipated 
that such parties could be brought into the 
action, by amendment, beyond the twelve-
month period. It would make no sense to 
consider the lien to be valid as against such 
persons unless it could be enforced against 
them by joining them in the action as previo-
usly commenced. Moreover, failure to join a 
defendant in the complaint as filed within the 
twelve-month period cannot be conclusively 
fatal to the claimant's ability to enforce the 
hen as against the defendant or it would be 
meaningless for the statute to refer to the 
continued effectiveness of the hen, even absent 
timely recordation of a lis pendens, as against 
nonparties, like Valley Bank in this case, who 
have actual knowledge of the anion. 
We conclude that section 38-1-51 should 
be read as a whole to require a hen claimant 
to commence a mechanic's lien action and 
record a corresponding lis pendens within the 
twelve-month period. Commencing the 
action preserves the lien. Recording the lis 
pendens imparts constructive notice of the hen 
enforcement action to everyone interested in 
the liened property. Only when the claimant 
fails to timely record the lis pendens can an 
interested person argue that it is not subject to 
the lien, and then only if such person was not 
named as a party and did not have actual 
knowledge of the action. 
In this case, Projects commenced the action 
and filed the lis pendens within the required 
twelve-month period. Valley Bank was the-
refore subject to the lien14 and could properly 
be joined by an appropriate amendment to the 
complaint as was done in this case. The trial 
court accordingly erred when it dismissed 
Valley Bank from the action.** 
VH. AMBIGUITY OF 'PAKI1AL* U E N 
RELEASE 
The trial court granted Cottonwood Thrift 
A Loan Company's summary judgment 
motion on two grounds: First, the court con-
cluded that, 'based on undisputed facts / 
Cottonwood Thrift had reasonably relied upon 
the recorded lien release. Second, the court 
concluded that the effect of the release was 
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dear on its face. Projects agues on appeal that 
the release was ambiguous. It also argues that 
reasonable reliance is a concept necessarily too 
fact-sensitive for disposition by summary 
judgment. 
Whether a contract is ambiguous is a ques-
tion of law. E.g., Morris v. Mountain States 
Tel. & Tel Co.. 658 P.2d 1199, 1200 (Utah 
1983). Moreover, the trial court must deter-
mine 'whether a contract is ambiguous ... 
before it takes any evidence in clarification. * Id. 
It follows, therefore, that if the contract is 
clear on its face, the trial court need not--
and in fact should not-consider evidence of 
a contrary meaning. 
The release in this case stated in pertinent 
part that Projects "in consideration of 
[S90,000] ... does hereby release, satisfy and 
discharge that certain claim of lien ... against 
the following described real property/ The 
release then described units 4 and 5. This 
language is susceptible of no other interpret-
ation but that the two units were completely 
released from the scope of the lien.M The trial 
court properly construed the release as a 
matter of law and properly declined to cons-
ider evidence of another intent. Consequently, 
we affirm the trial court's decision to dismiss 
Cottonwood Thrift from the action.17 
vni. CONCLUSION 
The trial court's order and judgment of 
dismissal are affirmed only as they relate to 
Cottonwood Thrift.11 As to Copper State and 
Valley Bank, we reverse and remand for trial 
or other appropriate proceedings consistent 
with this decision. 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice 
Richard C. Howe, Associate Chief Justice 
1. Daniel Stewart, Justice 
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice 
Durham, Justice, having disqualified 
herself, does not participate herein; Gregory 
K. Orme, Court of Appeals Judge, sat. 
1. Accordingly, the metes and bounds description 
was not confined to the property on which the eight 
units constructed by Projects were located. 
However, it appears from the record that the only 
new structures on any part of the Highland Orch-
ards property were the units constructed by Proj-
ects. 
2. The Banks do not argue that Projects completely 
failed to comply with any of the particular require-
ments of Utah Code Ann. §38-1-7 (1983). 
Rather, they argue that Projects' efforts did not 
substantially comply with the statutes. 
J. This trend is not confined to this area of the law 
but can be seen in others as well. See, e.g., Tech-
Fluid Servs., inc. v. Oavilan Operating, Inc., 787 
PJd 1328 (Utah a . App. 1990). In Tccb-Fluid, 
the Utah Court of Appeals took a similar position 
in the area of redemption. The court concluded that 
where the provisions in the redemption statute are 
'procedural in nature and do not affect any subst-
VTAHADVA 
Copper State Thrift
 1C 
dv, Ren 7 ££ 
antive rights of the purchaser ... [substantial] com-
pliance is all that is necessary.* Id. at 1334. 
4. The current version of section 38-1-7 provides 
in pertinent pan: 
(2) This notice shall contain a statement 
setting forth the following information: 
(a) the name of the reputed 
owner if known or, if not known, 
the name of the record owner; 
(b) the name of the person 
by whom he was employed or to 
whom he furnished the equipment 
or material; 
(c) the time when the first 
and last labor or service was 
performed or the first and last 
equipment or material was furn-
ished; 
(d) a description of the pro-
perty, sufficient for identifica-
tion; and 
(e) the signature of the lien 
claimant or his authorized agent 
and an acknowledgment or cert-
ificate .... 
Utah Code Ann. §38-1-7 (Supp. 1990). Requir-
ements under the 1984 version of this provision 
which are no longer pan of the statute include 
actual verification of the statements in the lien 
notice, "a statement of (the claimant's) demand 
after deducting all just credits and offsets ... (, and] 
a statement of the terms, time given and conditions 
of his contract ....* Utah Code Ann. §38-1-7 
(Supp. 1983). 
5. It is important to emphasize the scope of this 
opinion. Our focus is of course upon the particular 
parties and particular facts in this case, but it is 
further narrowed by the "as a matter of law" stan-
dard implicit in reviewing summary judgments. It 
may well be that the same lien notices would have 
worked significant prejudice on other parties not 
before us, such as owners of, or lenders secured by, 
the phase II parcel to which Projects had no valid 
daim. Thus it is entirely possible that we would 
invalidate this same notice as it applied to another 
party who could demonstrate prejudice. Cf. Horse-
shoe Estates v. 2M Co., 713 PJd 776, 781 (Wyo. 
1986) (holding lien sufficient as against party who 
failed to demonstrate prejudice or that it was 
misled). It is even conceivable that the Banks, or 
some of them, could demonstrate actual prejudice in 
the context of a trial. At this juncture, however, we 
only consider the Banks* contention that the hens 
are so flawed as to simply be void, regardless of any 
actual prejudice. 
6. Section 38-1-7 has been amended since 1983. See 
supra note 4. 
7. In First Security Mortgage, a lien notice was held 
invalid because the hen claimant failed to sign the 
oath. The notice was insufficient even though the 
notary had signed the certificate. See also Worthi-
ngtoo 4 Kimball Constr. Co. y. C it A Dev. Co., 
777 PM 475 (Utah 1989). 
I. In 1989, the legislature amended the mechanic's 
ben statute to specifically provide a particular jurat 
form. The current statute requires *an acknowled-
gment or certificate as required under Chapter 3, 
Title 57/ Utah Code Ann. |38-l-7(2)(e) (Supp. 
1990). 
9. We recognize that this conclusion is inconsistent 
with ID re Williamson, 43 Bankr. 813 (D. Utah 
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J984), on which the thai court heavily relied. ID 
Willi Am son, the bankruptcy court found that each 
dement listed in section 46-1-6 was an essential 
pan of a notary's certificate even when made on a 
mechanic's lien. Id. at 823. Utah law was admitt-
edly unclear on this point when Williamson was 
decided. Nonetheless, we disagree with the analysis 
in Williamson and hold to the contrary. 
10. It is not enough for the Banks to show that 
other persons might have been prejudiced by the lien 
notice. In order to prevail, the Banks must show 
that they were somehow misled or prejudiced. See 
supra note 5. 
11. At the risk of unnecessary repetition, we reite-
rate that in holding that the description does not 
invalidate the hen as to the Banks, we do not mean 
to suggest that the result would be the same for 
others. The lien, for example, is ineffective as to the 
phase II property, in which the Banks claim no 
interest, and inclusion of that property in the lien 
notices would subject Projects to appropriate relief 
in a slander of title action. See supra note 5. 
12 In Hostetter, the Montana court specifically 
noted that the blanket hen was effective against the 
entire condominium project because 'the work was 
performed under one contract, and not a series of 
separate contracts for each unit.* Hostetter v. 
Inland Dev. Corp., 172 Mont. 167, 170, 561 P.2d 
1323, 1325 (1977). Apparently, Montana courts have 
adopted the position that a single hen may not 
encompass work performed under multiple contr-
acts. See Caird Eng'g Works v. Seven-up Gold 
Mining Co., Ill Mont. 471, 4*7-89, 111 P.2d 267, 
276 (1941). We have declined to adopt that position 
and thus disavow that aspect of the Hostetter deci-
sion. 
13. Although both parties have characterized section 
38-1-11 as a statute of limitation, we do not view 
it strictly as such. Rather, it contains one of the 
requirements with which the claimant must comply 
'before (that] party is entitled to the benefits created 
by the (mechanic's lien] statute." AAA Fencing Co. 
v. Raintree Dev. A Energy Co.% 714 P.2d 289, 291 
(Utah 1986). The penalty for not commencing an 
action to enforce a mechanic's lien within the twelve-
month period provided in section 38-1-11 is inv-
alidation of the lien rather than preclusion of the 
claim as with a traditional statute of limitation. See, 
e.g., Utah Code Ann. §78-12-23 (Supp. 1986). 
The commencement requirement of section 38-1-
11 serves as a substantive restriction on the lien 
action and, unlike a true statute of limitation, is not 
waived if not pleaded. AAA, 714 PM at 291. 
14. It is worth noting that even if Projects had not 
recorded its lis pendens timely, Valley Bank would 
still be subject to the lien because it had actual 
knowledge of Projects* action by no later than 
August 1984, when it reviewed a title report disclo-
sing the action and commenced a dialogue with 
Projects coiscerning the matter. 
15. Although Valley Bank directs our attention to 
California and Illinois decisions holding that a lien 
claimant may in no event add defendants after 
expiration of the dealine for filing a mechanic's lien 
action, we art not persuaded by those decisions. As 
previously noted, unlike California and Illinois sta-
tutes, section 3*-1-11 is sot a true statute of 
limitation. See supra note 13. Moreover, our statute 
is significantly different from the statutes in Calif-
ornia and Illinois because it does not merely impose 
a dealine for commencement of the action, but goes 
on to delineate persons who will be subject to the 
ben even though not joined in the action within the 
twelve-month period. Our attention is drawn to no 
decision construing similar language in any otheT 
mechanic's 
16. Projects argues that the release was ambiguous 
because the word 'Partial* was added to the 
'Release of Uen" beading. However, in the context 
of this case, the release clearly was 'partial * because 
it only released two of the eight units otherwise 
covered by the lien notice. We do not believe that 
the addition created any ambiguity in the instru-
ment. 
In the determination of the real chara-
cter of a contract, courts will always 
look to its purpose rather than to the 
name given it by the parties, and where 
a conflict exists between a name attem-
pted to be applied to a particular cont-
ract and the language of the contract 
itself, the name will be rejected as ina-
pplicable. 
17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts §269 (1964) (footnote 
omitted). 
17. Because we agree that the release was clear and 
was not ambiguous, we need not address Projects' 
reasonable reliance arguments. 
18. The Banks request on appeal that we award 
attorney fees based upon Utah Code Ann. §38-1-
18 (1988), which provides: 'In any action brought to 
enforce any lien under this chapter the successful 
party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable atto-
rneys' fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be 
taxed as costs in the action." In view of our 
holding, except as concerns Cottonwood Thrift, 
determination of any party's 'success" is clearly 
premature. In the case of Cottonwood Thrift, we 
note that h, along with the other banks, did not 
request attorney fees as part of its motion for 
summary judgment. We will not entertain issues 
raised for the first time on appeal. Zions First Nat'l 
Bank v. National Am. Title ins. Co., 749 P-2d 651, 
657 (Utah 1988). Therefore, we decline to consider 
Cottonwood Thrift's request for fees even though it 
has successfully defeated Projects' claims against it. 
142 Utah Adv. Rep, 16 
IN T H E 
U T A H COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ai tk* a l t er* of RJL, 
Pkaisjttffaerf 
VMK» a M K*K*9 
State of Disk, i t Ike tatarttf «f tLD.H., 
Ptatettffttd 
v. 
K.G.. 
Drtotutaa 
N#« ePM9«m^A 
N . . t » 1 7 3 - C A 
UTAH ADVANCE KETOKTS 
